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Abstract 
Rare earth elements (REEs) have gained increasing attention recently for several key reasons: 1) they 
are vital to many strategic industries, 2) they are relatively scarce, 3) they frequently exhibit high price 
fluctuations, 4) China holds a quasi-monopoly on their mining, and 5) China’s REE policy, which was 
overly restrictive and led to a formal complaint from the U.S., Japan, and the EU at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2012. This paper investigates whether the announcement of a WTO dispute 
resolution case has the power to fundamentally change market dynamics. We find empirical support 
for this notion because REE prices exhibit a structural break around the announcement of the WTO 
dispute, and show lower variance ratios for all tested REEs afterward. This indicates a tendency toward 
efficiency, although REE prices still do not follow a random walk. Similarly, we find that stock price 
informativeness of companies in the REE industry increases after the announcement, reflecting more 
firm-specific than marketwide information and less governmental influence. Finally, we show that 
model uncertainty for option pricing models decreases, which we measure by the lower pricing 
differences among them. 
JEL Classification: F13, G14, Q02, Q38 
Keywords: Market Efficiency, Rare Earth Elements, Stock Price Informativeness, 
Structural Break Test, Variance Ratio Test, World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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The rare earth elements (REE) market has gained increasing attention in recent years 
because REEs are of paramount and strategic importance for a variety of green- and high-
technology products, such as hybrid and electric cars, wind energy turbines, photovoltaic cells, 
mobile phones, hard and CD drives, and permanent magnets (Van Gosen et al., 2014).
1
 However, 
well above 80% of global REE mine production and more than 50% of worldwide REE reserves 
are located in China. The recent bankruptcy filing of Molycorp on June 25, 2015, which was one 
of the largest REE mining corporations outside China, may further increase the worldwide 
dependence on REEs mined in China in the future (see McCarty and Casey, 2015; Miller and 
Zheng, 2015; and Reuters, 2015). Thus, China essentially has global dominance over and control 
of the REE market, and it only intensified with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s 2006 
announcement of export restrictions in the form of export quotas (the so-called MOFCOM 
announcements) (see Fig. 1, step 1). These export quotas, and particularly a 40% reduction in 
production in 2010, were presumably the cause of the dramatic price increases seen for foreign 
REE prices (or so-called FOB – free on board – prices) during the second half of 2011. Domestic 
REE prices (or so-called China prices) were substantially lower, placing foreign competitors in 
the REE market at a disadvantage. 
– Please insert Figure 1 about here – 
In fact, the export restrictions on REEs and their overall pricing system were the catalyst 
for the U.S., Japan, and the EU to lodge formal complaints against China at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on March 13, 2012 (hereafter, the WTO event).
2
 This has led to a series of 
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Affairs/The Materials Research Society (2010), APS Panel on Public Affairs/The Materials Research Society (2011), 
Goonan (2011), and Binnemans et al. (2013). 
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reports concerning how to better secure access to REEs by the U.S. Congress (see Fig. 1, step 2, 
as well as the European Commission, 2012; Morrison and Tang, 2012; Bailey Grasso, 2013; and 
Humphries, 2013). 
The WTO generally focuses on negotiating new agreements for reducing trade burdens 
among its member states. Furthermore, it is also heavily involved in evaluating complaints and 
issuing sanctions in case of violations of agreements in place (see Liebman and Tomlin, 2008). 
However, besides the shareholder value effects for firms affected by the consequences of WTO 
disputes and its adjudicates, we know very little about how the WTO’s actions affect the 
underlying markets (see, e.g., Lenway et al., 1990; Lenway et al., 1996; and Liebman and 
Tomlin, 2007, 2008, for research on shareholder behavior).
3
 While the majority of studies 
analyze the effect of WTO rulings on share prices of companies in the industries affected by the 
respective ruling, Desai and Hines Jr. (2008) were the first to investigate the effects of the 
announcement of the filing of a complaint at the WTO. 
However, the focus so far has been on examining stock price reactions using event 
studies. In particular, there have been only limited efforts to ascertain the WTO’s effectiveness, 
and whether the announcement of a dispute resolution case has the power to fundamentally 
change market dynamics. We believe this is an important question, because an effective 
enforcement mechanism to resolve disputes is essential to promoting compliance with the WTO’s 
rules. Moreover, changes in the underlying market dynamics are presumably more long-lived 
than shareholder behavior (Davey, 2003). 
We address this research question empirically by analyzing the announcement effects of 
the WTO event on the REE market. If the complaint is credible, and the WTO has effective 
enforcement power, we expect to find that the Chinese government reconsidered, and adapted 
                                                          
3












their REE policy to somewhat reduce their influence on REEs (see Fig. 1, step 3). We observe 
direct evidence for this behavior in the Chinese government’s statement at the end of 2014 that 
they would stop using export quotas for REEs because of the WTO’s ruling that the practice is at 
odds with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (see WSJ, 2015).
4
 However, if 
credible actions by the Chinese government had already been undertaken after the initiation of 
the WTO dispute resolution case in 2012, we anticipate finding noticeable effects on the price 
dynamics of REEs. This would provide evidence that even the launch of a WTO trial has the 
power to spur policy changes and add to the findings of Desai and Hines Jr. (2008). Accordingly, 
the launch of the dispute resolution case on March 13, 2012 serves as a natural experiment.
5
 
First, we expect to observe a structural break in the time series of REE prices around the 
announcement date, which would indicate a change in their dynamics. Using Bai and Perron’s 
(1998, 2003a, 2003b) procedure for multiple structural changes of a time series, we find support 
for this notion for most REEs, regardless of whether FOB or China REE prices are used. Next, 
we calculate Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Wright (2000) pre- and post-announcement variance 
ratios in order to infer whether the market for REEs is efficient. We find that pre-announcement 
REE prices do not follow a random walk, and thus price formation is not efficient. However, after 
the initiation of the WTO trial, we find considerably lower variance ratios for all tested REEs. 
This indicates a general tendency toward efficiency, but prices still do not follow a random walk. 
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 See TMR (2014) and WTO (2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f) for more information on the dispute 
resolution case. 
5
 We use the announcement date of the WTO dispute resolution case as our event date because this is, in our view, 
the “cleanest” and earliest event date one could use in our “one-case event study.” While there were rumors of a 
potential launch of a WTO dispute resolution case against China, it became a certainty on March 13, 2012, when the 
U.S., Europe, and Japan launched their case. Note that any information processing due to rumors or speculation 
before the event date would have happened during our “pre-WTO” period. This anticipation would make it harder to 
find statistically significant results in our “post-WTO” period. Therefore, we interpret our derived results as 
conservative (see Online Appendix A.9 for a detailed overview). Other event dates during the dispute resolution case 
could also be used to determine the importance of other announcements, but it would result in confounding events 













Second, if the Chinese government reassesses its REE policy and ultimately interferes less 
in the market, this policy change should be reflected in the stock price informativeness of 
companies in the REE market. The idea is that less informative stock prices convey less firm-
specific information. Their stock price variation can thus be explained to a larger extent by 
marketwide factors (see Gul et al., 2010). 
If this conjecture holds, and the Chinese government changes its REE policy as a result of 
the announcement of the WTO dispute resolution case, we would expect the informativeness of 
REE stock prices to increase. This is because firm-specific information tends to take precedence 
over marketwide factors such as REE prices. We show that the stock price informativeness of 
companies in the REE industry increases statistically significantly after the WTO event compared 
to other industries. This result is consistent with the view that less intervention by the Chinese 
government after the announcement of the WTO trial led to REE company stock prices that were 
more reflective of firm-specific than marketwide information. 
Third, we analyze model uncertainty for the three option pricing models of Black-Scholes 
(1973), Duan (1995), and Heston and Nandi (2000) by comparing their pre- and post-WTO event 
price differences. Similarly to the previous argument, that less intervention in the REE market 
would reduce exogenously driven erratic price behavior of REEs, the post-WTO event pricing 
differences among the option pricing models should be lower if the Chinese government has 
reduced its interference. Our results strongly support this notion. The discrepancies between the 
models are not only statistically significantly lower, but, with average reductions of more than 
70%, economically meaningful as well. Note that the high model uncertainty prior to the WTO 
event presumably contributed to the blocking of a proposed REE derivatives market. In line with 
this reasoning, after the WTO event, the plan to open an REE (derivatives) exchange in China 












Products Exchange, was established, but it does not offer any REE derivatives products (see 
Bloomberg News, 2014). However, the Shanghai Futures Exchange announced in mid-2014 that 
they would enhance their product portfolio by launching REE derivatives (Shen, 2014). The 
introduction of liquid REEs and derivatives markets are necessary for suppliers and for user firms 
to, e.g., reduce earnings fluctuations, which will decrease bankruptcy risk and delivery 
bottlenecks (see Fig. 1, step 4). 
Fourth, as a whole, our study contributes to the extant and growing literature on the 
effects of trade disputes and WTO rulings in several ways. While current literature concentrates 
primarily on analyzing shareholder wealth transfers of actual WTO rulings, we provide a unique 
perspective by analyzing how even the announcement of a WTO dispute can induce 
governmental changes in existing policies (see Lenway et al., 1990; Lenway et al., 1996; and 
Liebman and Tomlin, 2007, 2008). We extend and complement these research findings. We 
provide evidence that not only does the price-generating process of REEs change after the WTO 
event, but the stock price informativeness for REE companies increases. In contrast to Müller et 
al. (2016), we do not analyze effects in response to MOFCOM export quota announcements 
using event studies. Instead, we go one step further and focus on the commencement of the 
dispute resolution case at the WTO, which may to some extent be a consequence of the quotas. 
In summary, we interpret our results as strong support for the notion that governments 
accused of violating GATT react to the announcement with policy changes. These actions, 
however, are not simply “window dressing,” but rather have statistically significantly and 
economically meaningful marketwide effects and implications. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the methodology used for our analyses, while section 3 describes our data gathering process. 













2.1. Variance Ratio Tests 
Variance ratio tests have been used to test for the random behavior of price movements 
since the 1960s. One of the first applications was in Alexander (1961), who calculated variance 
ratios for the time series used by Kendall (1953), and concluded that the price series followed a 
random walk. Since then, time series ranging from financial market data such as stock returns 
(see, for example, Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Poterba and Summers, 1988; and Ayadi and Pyun, 
1994) and exchange rates (Liu and He, 1991) to economic time series such as GDP (see, e.g., 
Cochrane, 1988) have been analyzed with the help of variance ratio tests. Charles and Darné 
(2009) provide a solid overview.
6
 
One of the most common variance ratio tests is the methodology proposed by Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988). If the time series at hand is indeed a random process, the variance of the 
increments of the process should be proportional to the sampling horizon because it is linear in its 
sampling interval (see Cochrane, 1988; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; and Poterba and Summers, 
1988). In other words, 𝑞 times the variance of a time series’ first differences should equal the 
variance of a time series’ 𝑞-differences (see Liu and He, 1991; Ayadi and Pyun, 1994; Wright, 
2000; and Charles and Darné, 2009). Accordingly, if a time series follows a random walk 
process, the variance of two-month first differences should equal twice the variance of one-month 
first differences. Comparing the variances for different sample intervals then allows us to test 
whether the time series at hand is governed by a random process (because the variance ratios 
should equal 1). 
Formally, we calculate the variance ratios as follows: 
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There are several different variance ratio tests. See, for example, Chow and Denning (1993) and Whang and Kim 
(2003) for multiple variance ratio tests, and Wright (2000) for a non-parametric variance ratio test. However, most of 


















?̂?(2) + ⋯ +
2
𝑞
?̂?(𝑞 − 1),     (1) 
where ?̂?(𝑘) represents the estimator for the autocorrelation coefficient of order 𝑘 for the first 
differences of the time series at hand (see Lo and MacKinlay, 1988). To allow for deviations of 
the time series from normality and time-varying volatility, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) develop a 
test statistic that allows for heteroscedasticity: 
𝑧∗(𝑞) = √𝑛𝑞?̅?𝑟(𝑞)/√𝜃,         (2) 
where 𝜃 denotes the asymptotic variance of ?̅?𝑟(𝑞). 
However, conventional variance ratio tests, such as the procedure in Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988), suffer from size distortions and lack power in case of non-normal data (Wright, 2000; 
Charles and Darné, 2009). Hence, Wright (2000) proposes a non-parametric rank-based variance 
ratio test that is more precise and more powerful than alternatives such as fractional integration: 
Let 𝑦𝑡 be a series of asset returns and 𝑟(𝑦𝑡) be the rank of 𝑦𝑡 among 𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑇. We can define 










), where the former is a linear 
transformation of the ranks so that it has mean 0 and variance 1, while the latter is the inverse 
normal, or van der Waerden score, and has mean 0 and variance ~1. Φ is the standard normal 
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 The variance ratio tests are based on log prices (levels), which could potentially be affected by different price 
levels. Urquhart and McGroarty (2016) provide evidence on this issue. They fail to find any consistent pattern of 
market conditions (e.g., bull or bear markets) driving the variance ratio test results. Instead, they find the results are 












2.2. Multiple Structural Change Tests 
Besides using variance ratio tests to gauge whether the commencement of a WTO trial has 
an efficiency-enhancing effect, we analyze whether we can identify structural changes in the 
dynamics of the time series of REE prices surrounding that date. Because the exact number of 
structural breaks in a time series is often unknown ex ante, Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, 2003b) 
propose a series of tests to determine the number of structural changes in a time series 
endogenously. In particular, Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, 2003b) develop a sup𝐹𝑇(ℓ + 1|ℓ) test 
of the null hypothesis of ℓ breaks versus the alternative hypothesis of ℓ + 1 breaks. In principle, 
this method applies ℓ + 1 tests of the null hypothesis of no structural break versus the alternative 
hypothesis of one structural break, which is then applied to each segment containing the 
observations ?̂?𝑖−1 to ?̂?𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , ℓ + 1) where ?̂?0 = 0 and ?̂?ℓ+1 = 𝑇. An additional break is 
included as long as the overall minimum value of the sum of squared residuals is sufficiently 
smaller than the sum of squared residuals from the model with ℓ breaks. Formally, the test 
statistic is given as: 
𝐹𝑇(ℓ|ℓ + 1) = {𝑆𝑇(?̂?1, … , ?̂?ℓ) − min1≤𝑖≤ℓ+1 inf𝜏∈Λ𝑖,𝜂 𝑆𝑇(?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑖−1, 𝜏, ?̂?𝑖, … , ?̂?ℓ)} /?̂?
2. 
 (3) 
This procedure uses a general-to-specific modeling strategy, and is recommended by Bai 













2.3. Stock Price Informativeness 
2.3.1. Measuring Stock Price Informativeness 
Our goal is to measure the impact of the WTO trial on the stock price informativeness of 
REE companies. We thus closely follow the methodology of Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers 
(2006), Gul et al. (2010), and Tan et al. (2015). The underlying idea is to calculate the stock price 
informativeness of companies in the REE industry, and to compare it for each company 𝑖 before 
and after the WTO event. The measure of choice is stock price synchronicity as used by Gul et al. 
(2010), which is defined as: 




2 ),         (4) 
where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏 is the annual stock price synchronicity of company 𝑖 in year (period) 𝜏, 𝑙𝑜𝑔 
refers to the natural logarithm, 𝜏 = 0 refers to the WTO event, and 𝜏 = −1 (𝜏 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒) to the year 
(period) before the WTO event.
8
 𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2  is obtained from the regression in Equation (5):
9
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝑅𝑡
(𝑗) + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝑅𝑡−1
(𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    (5) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily stock return of company 𝑖 on day 𝑡, and 𝑀𝑅𝑡 is equal to the market index 
return on day 𝑡. The proxy for the market index is the daily aggregated market return index with 
cash dividends reinvested (volume-weighted) for all A shares (listed on either the Shanghai or 




 represents the industry index return on day 𝑡 
for the respective industry 𝑗, based on the six industry classifications from Industry Code A.  
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 The pre-WTO period (𝜏 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒) covers August 20, 2009 through March 12, 2012 (2.5 years), and the post-WTO 
period (𝜏 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) covers March 14, 2012 through September 30, 2014 (2.5 years). We set the beginning (end) date 
of the pre-WTO period (post-WTO period) to have an equal number of trading days in both periods. This is done to 
obtain a balanced sample even if the calendar days suggest otherwise because of public holidays and stock exchange 
closures. 
9
 In unreported results, we tested the robustness of our results for a reduced market model with the following form: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The results are highly similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance and are 
available from the authors upon request. 
10
 In unreported results, we used the equally weighted index instead, and our results are virtually identical to those 












We consider only three of the six industries simply because REE industry companies are 
only present in Utilities, Conglomerates, and Industry. A company is included in the respective 
industry if 1) it is active during the 2.5 years before and after the beginning of the WTO trial on 
March 13, 2012, 2) we observe minimum liquidity, meaning that daily return data is available for 
at least 200 trading days for the two years before and after the WTO event,
11
 and 3) the equally 
weighted industry index is unique for every company 𝑖, because all companies within the same 
industry (satisfying conditions (1) and (2)) are considered except company 𝑖. Our final sample is 
comprised of 834 companies (with A shares) in the three industries Utilities (111), 
Conglomerates (34), and Industry (689) that satisfy these conditions. 
The idea is as follows: High 𝑅2s in the market model regression (see Equation (5)) mean 
that most of a company’s price fluctuations are explained by marketwide and/or industrywide 
information (high stock price synchronicity), and fewer are explained by firm-specific 
information (low stock price informativeness). Put differently, the higher the 𝑅2, the lower the 
measure for stock price informativeness, and thus a company’s stock price will contain less 
company-specific information (see, e.g., Chen et al., 2007, for a more detailed discussion). In line 
with Morck et al. (2000) and Gul et al. (2010), we apply a logistic transformation to circumvent 
the bounded nature of 𝑅2 within [0, 1] and calculate 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏 (see Equation (4)). Thus, a higher 
𝑅2 leads to a higher stock price synchronicity measure 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏, and implies greater co-
movements with market- and/or industrywide information and fewer with company-specific 
information. It follows that developed markets such as the U.S. have lower 𝑅² and lower (usually 
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 For the two half-year periods (from 2 to 2.5 years) before and after the WTO event, we require at least daily 












negative) 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏 than emerging markets with less investor protection, which could discourage 
informed investors from trading (see, e.g., Morck et al., 2000).
12
 
Finally, and analogously to our previous approach, we run the following regression to 
implicitly identify companies in the REE industry with a statistical method. We again calculate 
the 𝑅2 for all 834 companies that satisfy the three conditions above: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,        (6) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 is the respective “REE index” return on day 𝑡. Our rationale is that higher 𝑅
2s 
mean a higher proportion of companies’ stock price variations can be explained by REE price 
movements. Therefore, companies have a higher exposure to the REE industry. 
However, there is no single best way to identify companies in the REE industry based on 
this search strategy, so we tried a few alternatives for 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡. We first construct four REE 
indices containing the four most important elements, cerium (Ce), lanthanum (La), neodymium 
(Nd), and yttrium (Y), which make up about 90% of total REE usage (see Goonan, 2011). We 
then calculate a usage-weighted index and an equally weighted index based on FOB (foreign) and 
China (domestic) prices (see Morrison and Tang, 2012; and Bailey Grasso, 2013). 
In the next step, we select the 10, 25, and 50 companies with the highest 𝑅2 in Equation 
(6) in the following selection periods: year 1 prior to the WTO event (𝜏 = −1), year 2 prior to the 
WTO event (𝜏 = −2), and the pre-WTO event period (𝜏 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒) (which covers the 2.5-year 
period before the event). This leaves us with thirty-six possible combinations: 3 (10, 25, and 50 
companies) × 3 (𝜏 = −1, −2, and 𝑝𝑟𝑒-selection period) × 2 (REE Index based on FOB and 
China prices) × 2 (equally and usage-weighted REE Indices) = 36. We manually checked five 
companies identified as having the highest correlation with the REE indices, and found that all 
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 Note that stock price synchronicity is not affected by REE price levels, which change substantially during the pre-
WTO period. This is because 𝑅2 is based on stock returns, and REE prices are used only to identify companies in the 
REE space. As a further check, the company descriptions in Table A.1 denote whether the identified companies are 












operated directly in the REE industry or held stakes in companies in the REE industry (see Table 
A.1 in the appendix). Therefore, we are convinced that this procedure is suitable for identifying 
companies with REE exposure. 
In unreported results, we complemented this implicit approach for REE company 
identification with an explicit approach. Similarly to Müller et al. (2016), we used only publicly 
listed companies on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange that are mentioned in MOFCOM’s 
REE export quota announcements. This approach has a clear advantage in that those companies 
have been determined to be in the REE industry. However, that advantage comes with certain 
disadvantages, because we capture only REE mining companies, or companies that are relatively 
early in the REE supply chain (refining). Chinese high-tech companies, for example, are also 
arguably affected by REE price development. Furthermore, we are left with a maximum of 
fourteen companies (not all were listed for the entire pre-/post-WTO period), which most likely 
significantly underestimates the industry. Nevertheless, the results of this approach are similar in 
terms of magnitude to the implicit approach, but with a lower statistical significance. This is 
attributable at least to some extent to the smaller sample size. 
2.3.2. Testing for REE Stock Price Informativeness Differences around the WTO Event 
To test whether our prediction of increasing REE stock price informativeness after the 
WTO event is correct, we first provide univariate evidence by comparing REE stock price 
synchronicity before and after the event. We then provide multivariate evidence, while 
controlling for the reference group and firm characteristics. The univariate test is as follows: 
Δ𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,[𝜏1;𝜏2] = 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏2 − 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏1,      (7) 
where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏 corresponds to the calculation from Equation (4), 𝜏1 stands for the respective 
period prior to the WTO event, and 𝜏2 stands for the period afterward. The [𝜏1; 𝜏2] periods we 












one-year period pre- and post-WTO event, and [𝜏𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡; 𝜏𝑃𝑟𝑒] is the symmetrical 2.5-year period 
pre- and post-WTO event. 
If we observe an increase in stock price informativeness (corresponding to a decrease in 
stock price synchronicity) following the WTO event, we would expect the 𝑅𝑖,𝜏2
2  from Equation 
(5) (and thus the resulting 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝜏2) to be lower afterward than before (𝜏1). Consequently, we 
expect the Δ𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑖,[𝜏1;𝜏2] for the REE industry companies to be statistically significantly lower than 
zero. The following example illustrates this prediction using Hubei Biocause Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd., which Equation (5) identifies as being among the ten companies with the highest 𝑅2 in the 
pre-WTO period. For this company, which has major holdings in China Minmetals Corporation 
(a mining company that also operates in the REE industry), we observe a -0.12 stock price 
synchronicity one year before the WTO event (𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,−1) (corresponding to an 𝑅𝑖,−1
2  of 0.47). 
In the year after the WTO event, the stock price synchronicity decreased to -0.49 (corresponding 
to an 𝑅𝑖,+1
2  of 0.38). This resulted in a -0.37 change in stock price synchronicity 
(Δ𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖,[+1;−1]), which means that stock price informativeness increased as hypothesized in 
response to the WTO event. 
To test for a relationship between the WTO event and the change in stock price 
informativeness in an OLS regression framework, we estimate the following basic structure of 
the regression model. This allows us to control for further potentially explanatory factors: 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝜏 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝜏−1𝑗 + 𝜉𝜏 + 𝜀𝜏,      (8) 
where the dependent variable 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝜏 is the annual stock price synchronicity calculated as in 
Equation (4), 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the pre-WTO period, and 0 












otherwise, and 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 is also a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is identified as a REE 
company (hereafter, REEC) according to Equation (6), and 0 otherwise. Our control variables are 
government holdings (𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣), trading volume (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒), firm size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), debt ratio 
(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒), standard deviation of the return on assets (𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑅𝑜𝐴)), market-to-book ratio (𝑀/𝐵), 
number of companies in the industry (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑁𝑢𝑚), and industry size (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) (see Table A.2 in 
the appendix for variable descriptions and calculations). 𝜉𝜏 are year fixed effects to control for 
potential macroeconomic trends in China. Given our previous argumentation, we do not show 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) or 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) explicitly in the regression tables. We use robust standard errors 
and omit firm-level notations for clarity in presentation of Equation (8). 
The spirit of the regression is similar to a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. The 
WTO event serves as an exogenous event that is expected to have an effect on 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶s but not on 
other companies. Therefore, the 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝑠 serve as a so-called treatment group, while all other 
firms serve as the control group. Within our regressions, we divide the sample into two periods, 
before (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1)) and after (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2)) the announcement of the WTO trial. We are 
predominantly interested in the DiD coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. If the REECs exhibit higher stock 
price synchronicity (lower informativeness) before the WTO event than the control group, we 
would expect 𝛽1 to be positive. After the exogenous event, we expect the stock price 
synchronicity measure 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 to drop compared to the pre-WTO period, thus implying 𝛽1 > 𝛽2. 
This would indicate that the 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 measure of REECs decreased relative to the unaffected 
control group companies after the WTO event. A change from a positive sign for 𝛽1 to a negative 
one for 𝛽2 is arguably the strongest effect, meaning that REECs exhibited higher values of 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 than the control group before the WTO event, and lower values afterward. If the WTO 













2.4. Derivatives Pricing 
Our goal is to determine whether market participants face less option pricing model 
uncertainty after the WTO event than beforehand. Our proxy measures are the pricing differences 
among three option pricing models: Black-Scholes (1973), Duan (1995), and Heston and Nandi 
(2000). We interpret larger differences as higher option pricing model uncertainty, and, if our 
intuition is correct, we expect the differences to decrease after the WTO event. As we mentioned 
earlier, there are no option exchanges for REEs yet. Thus, we are unable to compare the option 
pricing model results with actual option prices observed in a market. Given that, we choose three 
option pricing models exogenously and calculate prices under the assumption of how market 
participants would use them. We therefore aim not to identify the “best” option pricing model for 
REEs, but rather to establish that the pricing differences among models become smaller after the 
WTO event. 
For the first “static” analyses, our research design is similar to a DiD approach, using the 
WTO event as an exogenous shock and comparing option price differences before and after the 
event. We use the term “static” because we compare option prices at two different points in time 
– at the WTO event date, and thirty months later (September 15, 2014). To elaborate, we 
compare option prices at the WTO event date (𝑠 = 0), as well as on September 15, 2014, 
considering respectively the stream of information from REE prices for the previous thirty 
months. To derive the option prices at the WTO event date, we use the REE price developments 
before the WTO trial announcement (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 period), and, for September 15, 2014, the REE 
price developments afterward (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 period) (see Fig. 2 for a visual representation). The 












and Duan (1995), 2) Black-Scholes (1973) and Heston and Nandi (2000), and 3) Duan (1995) and 
Heston and Nandi (2000).
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We add the three option pricing differences (𝑃𝐷) for puts and calls for 35 [= 7 times to 
maturity  5 strike prices] distinct option price difference combinations of time to maturity and 
strike price. The calculation is as follows: 




𝑖=1 , (9a) 




𝑖=1 , (9b) 
𝐷𝑖𝐷𝑘 = 𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘|ℱ𝑡)𝑘 − 𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘|ℱ𝑠)𝑘,       (10) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘 are the REEs (𝑘 =cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium), and 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑗, 
𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑗, and 𝐻𝑁𝑖𝑗 represent the Black-Scholes (1973), Duan (1995), and Heston and Nandi 
(2000) option prices for either put or call options with seven strike prices 
[𝑖 = 85%, 90%, … ,115%] and five times to maturity as measured in months [𝑗 = 1, 3, 6, 9, 12]. 
𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 refers to the sum of the differences in option prices based on the different models, and 
based on information thirty months prior to the WTO event date (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 period). 𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 is 
the sum of the differences in option prices based on the different models, and based on 
information thirty months after the WTO event date (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 period). Filtration ℱ, i.e., ℱ𝑠, is 
all information available beginning thirty months prior to the WTO event until the WTO event 
date (-30 months <  WTO event date (𝑠)), and ℱ𝑡 is all information available beginning at the 
WTO event date until thirty months afterward (WTO event date (𝑠)  ≤ +30 months (𝑡)). 
We obtain Black-Scholes (1973) option prices by using a block bootstrap approach to 
incorporate the possible time-dependent structure in REE returns (see appendix A.8 for more 
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details). The two GARCH option prices – Duan (1995) and Heston and Nandi (2000) – are 
derived as follows: 
a) Duan’s (1995) NGARCH model: 
Motivated by the success of GARCH models in estimating and forecasting volatility, 
Duan (1995) first proposed an NGARCH(1,1) option pricing model. Given the asset price stream, 




= 𝑟𝑓 + 𝜆√ℎ𝑡+1 −
1
2
ℎ𝑡+1 + √ℎ𝑡+1𝜖𝑡+1,       (11) 
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2ℎ𝑡(𝜖𝑡 − 𝛾)
2,        (12) 







ℎ𝑡+1 + √ℎ𝑡+1𝑣𝑡+1,         (13) 
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2ℎ𝑡(𝑣𝑡 − 𝜔)
2,        (14) 
where 𝜔 = 𝛾 + 𝜆. 
b) Heston and Nandi’s (2000) model: 




= 𝑟𝑓 + (𝜆 −
1
2
) ℎ𝑡+1 + √ℎ𝑡+1𝜖𝑡+1,        (15) 
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝜖𝑡 − 𝛾√ℎ𝑡)
2
,        (16) 







ℎ𝑡+1 + √ℎ𝑡+1𝑣𝑡+1,         (17) 
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑣𝑡 − 𝜔√ℎ𝑡)
2
,        (18) 
where ω = γ + λ. 
Duan (1995) assumes a locally risk-neutral valuation relationship (LRNVR) to measure 












Heston and Nandi (2000) generally follow the LRNVR concept, and formulate an affine GARCH 
model that yields a closed-form solution. Note that such risk neutralization is conducted by 
means of linear pricing kernels and is not unique. For both GARCH models, we optimize the 
following likelihood to get the GARCH parameters: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐿 ∝ −
1
2







𝑡=1 .     (19) 




−𝑟𝑇𝐸𝑄[𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝑇 − 𝐾, 0)].        (20) 
This static approach has the clear advantage of being intuitive. However, it has the 
disadvantage that we cannot rule out alternative explanations such as non-normally distributed 
REE returns, or results that are sensitive to choosing only two points in time for the option price 
calculations. Furthermore, we can only evaluate the economic significance of the results, not the 
statistical significance. 
To address these concerns, we apply a consecutive “triple-difference” (DDD) approach, 
and construct three subperiods of equal length: sixty months prior to thirty months prior to the 
WTO event (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 period), thirty months prior to the WTO event to the WTO event 
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 period), and from the WTO event to thirty months afterward (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 period) (see 
Fig. 2, panel B, for a graphic representation). The spirit of the DDD is that it identifies whether 
the differences in option prices between the first two “control” subsamples (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 and 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 period) are consistently lower than those between the latter two “treatment” 
subsamples (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 period), which would indicate a clear influence of the 
WTO event. 
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To see whether results are robust for different times to maturity, strike prices, and option 
pricing models, we provide evidence separately and split the pricing differences. The following 
illustrates the formulas for call options based on pricing differences between the Black-Scholes 
(1973) and Duan (1995) models (|𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻|) with a time to maturity of one month 
(𝑦 = 1𝑚). This results in 210 option prices [210 = 7 strikes and 30 consecutive months] per 
model. The calculations for the DDDs are as follows: 




𝑚=−48 ,  (21a) 




𝑚=−24 ,  (21b) 




𝑚=0 ,  (21c) 
𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂)(𝑦=1𝑚; |𝐵𝑆−𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻|) =
1
210
(𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘|ℱ𝑠)𝑘 − 𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘|ℱ𝑟)𝑘) 
 (22a) 
𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂)(𝑦=1𝑚; |𝐵𝑆−𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻|) =
1
210
(𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘|ℱ𝑠)𝑘 − 𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑘|ℱ𝑡)𝑘) 
            (22b) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘 (𝑦=1𝑚; |𝐵𝑆−𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻|) = 𝐷𝑖𝐷
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂) − 𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂) (22c) 
To obtain the Black-Scholes (1973) option prices, we construct a consecutive monthly 
return path that estimates the volatility. In other words, for the option prices calculated, e.g., 59 
months before the WTO event date, we use only REE price information from the previous month 
(-60). For the following consecutive month (-58), we use only information from the previous 
month (-59). We thus refer to this approach as consecutive, because we always use the prior 
month’s information to price the options. 
For each sample period, we estimate the Heston and Nandi (2000) and NGARCH models 












respective subperiod. We further simulate the GARCH option prices by using Monte Carlo 
methods based on filtered end-of-month volatilities. Despite the analytical solutions from both 
the Heston and Nandi (2000) and Black-Scholes (1973) models, we use simulations to price the 
options in order to ensure a fair comparison. 
Finally, we test whether the DiD mean values from the “control” period 
(𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂)) are lower than those from the “treatment” period 
(𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂)), which would mean that 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘 is statistically significantly 
greater than zero. Note that the DDD approach cancels out any potential price level effect on the 
option price. 
– Please insert Figure 2 about here –  
3. Data 
Our data span January 2004 through September 2014, and come from the following 
databases: 
 The REE prices for La, Ce, Nd, and Y come from the Asian Metal database. Because of 
the dual pricing system of REEs, we consider both FOB (export) and China (domestic) 
prices, which are in USD/kg. If USD prices are not available, we use the official 
CNY/USD exchange rate available from the Federal Reserve System. Note that we do not 
use metal prices because oxides have much higher trading volumes (see Jackson and 
Christiansen, 1993). 
 To study market informativeness, we calculate usage- and equally weighted REE indices 
based on both domestic and FOB prices. See Appendix A.3 for a robustness check for 
China prices.  
 Chinese companies in the REE industry must be listed on either the Shenzhen or the 












volume (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒), firm size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), debt ratio (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒), standard deviation of return 
on assets (𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑅𝑜𝐴)), market-to-book ratio (𝑀/𝐵), number of companies in the industry 
(𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑁𝑢𝑚), industry size (𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)), and stock price data for all Chinese companies 
come from or are calculated by using CSMAR. We exclude initial listing day returns due 
to extreme returns. If a company’s stock is not traded, we set the return to zero. Finally, 
we calculate the market index as the value-weighted average index of all listed companies 
on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange, and similarly an industry index as the 
value-weighted average index for the respective industry. 
 We use the announcement date of the WTO dispute resolution case as our event date, 
because it is, in our view, the “cleanest” and earliest event date one could use in our “one-
case event study.” Although there had been rumors of a potential WTO dispute resolution 
case against China, they became a certainty on March 13, 2012, with the case brought by 
the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Note that we consider any information processing due to 
rumors prior to the event date as occurring during our “pre-WTO” period. Such 
speculation would make it more difficult to obtain statistically significant results in our 
“post-WTO” period. Therefore, we interpret our derived results as conservative (see 
Online Appendix A.9 for a detailed overview). Other event dates during the dispute 
resolution case could be used to determine the importance of announcements. However, 
this could result in confounding events and make it virtually impossible to isolate the 














4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Because the REEs are not of equal economic importance (Long et al., 2010), we focus in 
this article on the four elements with the highest consumption: Cerium oxide (Ce), lanthanum 
oxide (La), neodymium oxide (Nd), and yttrium oxide (Y). 2008 consumption statistics show that 
these four elements jointly account for about 90% of total REE consumption: Ce at 42,220 metric 
tons/32.94%, La at 38,665 metric tons/30.16%, Nd at 22,868 metric tons/17.84%, and Y at 
11,610 metric tons/9.06% (see Goonan, 2011). 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the time series of REE oxide prices; Table A.3 
in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the log returns.
15
 Panel A (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂) presents 
the descriptive statistics for the 2.5-year period prior to the launch of the WTO dispute resolution 
case on March 13, 2012; panel B (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂) presents the descriptive statistics for the 2.5-year 
period after the WTO event. Examining the mean of the USD/kg prices, it seems obvious that the 
dual pricing system leads to higher export prices (FOB prices) for the same elements than the 
China domestic price. This is further underlined by the fact that the median FOB price is higher 
than the domestic price for all elements, which holds for both the period before and the period 
after the launch of the WTO trial on March 13, 2012. However, in the post-WTO period, both 
FOB and China prices substantially decrease. Furthermore, the dispersion of prices as measured 
by their standard deviations decreases as well. More importantly, the differences between the 
domestic and export prices decreased after the initiation of the dispute resolution case against 
China. 
Regarding the descriptive statistics, all the time series of REE prices exhibit positive 
skewness, except the FOB price of yttrium oxide in the pre-WTO period. Moreover, all the time 
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 All REE log returns exhibit positive skewness except the FOB price of yttrium oxide. Regarding the fourth 












series of prices are platykurtic before the WTO event, but the FOB prices of neodymium and 
yttrium oxides and the China price of neodymium oxide become leptokurtic in the post-WTO 
period. 
– Please insert Table 1 about here – 
4.2 Results of the Variance Ratio Tests 
The goal in this subsection is to provide the first evidence about the effect of the WTO 
event on the price behavior of the four most important REEs (cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, 
and yttrium). We calculate variance ratio tests for the series of REE prices based on weekly 
prices, as in Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Liu and He (1991) (see panel A, Table 2).
16
 We report 
the calculated variance ratios ?̅?𝑟(𝑞) + 1 in the main rows, and the test statistics 𝑧
∗(𝑞) in 
parentheses for FOB and China prices.
17
 We then compare the results from the pre-WTO period 
(thirty months before the announcement) with those from the post-WTO period (thirty months 
after the announcement). 
We find that, in the pre-WTO period, the random walk hypothesis must be rejected for all 
REE oxide prices for all aggregation levels at least at a 5% significance level. Because of using 
the heteroscedasticity-robust test statistic, our results are robust to time-varying variances. As 
Equation (1) implies, the variance ratio for an aggregate value of 𝑞 = 2 in the first column of 
Table 2 should be equal to 𝜌(1) + 1, i.e., the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the one-
week returns plus 1. Accordingly, the value of ?̅?𝑟(𝑞) + 1 = 1.401 for FOB prices of lanthanum 
prior to the WTO event indicates that the autocorrelation of order 1 for weekly returns is about 
40%. This effect becomes more pronounced when increasing the aggregation value 𝑞. 
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 We also report results based on monthly REE prices as a robustness check at the end of subsection 4.2 (see, e.g., 
Poterba and Summers, 1988, for different levels of data granularity). 
17
 Besides using Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) heteroscedasticity-robust test statistic, we reran the analysis using 
Kim’s (2006) wild bootstrap with 10,000 replications. The results are virtually identical and are available from the 












Interestingly, and in line with our intuition, the variance ratios for almost all REE prices 
and aggregation levels decrease considerably after the launch of the WTO dispute resolution case 
(except for FOB prices for cerium and neodymium oxide at an aggregation value of 𝑞 = 2). For 
higher aggregation values, the variance ratios for all REEs dramatically decrease, to about 67% 
(see “Rel. Dif.” in panel A of Table 2). However, despite this substantial drop, it is not sufficient 
for the price behavior to be regarded as a random walk (expect for China prices for lanthanum). 
Because we allow the volatility to differ between the two subsamples, and because we use the 
heteroscedasticity-robust test statistic, these results are valid for periods of both increasing and 
decreasing prices, i.e., during both bull and bear markets. 
To strengthen our argument, we use the non-parametric rank-based variance ratio test 
suggested by Wright (2000). The results are in panel B of Table 2 and underline our previous 
findings: After the announcement of the commencement of the WTO dispute resolution case by 
the U.S., the EU, and Japan, the variance ratios dropped by as much as 75%. Nevertheless, we 
note that most series are not martingale differences, so the market for REEs remains inefficient in 
that sense. 
In summary, our results are consistent with the notion that, after the WTO event, REE 
price behavior ultimately changed, resulting in lower variance ratios. This is indicative of 
changes that enhanced the pricing efficiency of REEs. As a robustness check, we also used a 
monthly sampling interval for the variance ratio tests.
18
 The results were virtually identical to the 
weekly sampling interval. However, the results are indicative only, and we complement them 
with structural break tests in the following subsection. 
– Please insert Table 2 about here – 
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 Lo and MacKinlay (1988) use a four-week sampling period for their sensitivity analysis. Similarly, Poterba and 
Summers (1988) and Ayadi and Pyun (1994) use monthly data for their variance ratio tests. Tables showing monthly 












4.3 Results of the Structural Break Tests 
In this subsection, we aim to determine whether the WTO event is related to a change in 
REE prices, without exogenously setting the date as we did in the previous analyses. If the WTO 
event has an impact on the price behavior of REEs, we expect to locate a structural break around 
the event, which occurred on March 13, 2012 (calendar week 11 in 2012). 
We follow Awokuse et al. (2009) and use Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003a, 2003b) test for 
estimating the breaks in REE prices. Based on the sequential procedure, the dates for the first 
break are generally located in the second half of 2010/first half of 2011 (the dates for the first 
breakpoint span calendar week 29-2010 to calendar week 10-2011).
19
 More interestingly, we find 
breakpoints that are relatively close to the announcement of the WTO event (the dates for the 
second breakpoint span calendar week 9-2012 to calendar week 31-2012), except for the China 
price of lanthanum and the FOB price of yttrium (see Table 3). Since it seems unrealistic that 
REE price behavior would change immediately, we believe the break dates are within a 
reasonable post-announcement date time frame. We interpret this as further support for the notion 
that the launch of the WTO dispute resolution case against China is related to changes in REE 
price behavior. 
– Please insert Table 3 about here – 
In summary, we find multiple streams of evidence that the price-generating process of 
REEs changed in response to the launch of the WTO trial, and experienced a structural break in 
such a way that the variance ratios of REE prices shrank thereafter. However, we have not yet 
determined whether the changes are economically meaningful. We address this in the next two 
subsections by analyzing the impact on stock price informativeness and on derivatives pricing.  
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 Note that the break dates identified by Bai and Perron’s (2003a, 2003b) sup𝐹(ℓ + 1|ℓ) test in Table 3 are not in 












4.4 Results for Stock Price Informativeness 
This subsection provides evidence about the differences in stock price informativeness 
before and after the WTO event. First, we present univariate evidence only for companies in the 
REE industry. Second, we use a multivariate DiD setting to illustrate the change in stock price 
informativeness of REE companies compared to other companies in the same industry. Finally, 
we conduct several robustness checks of the results for alternative estimation and REE industry 
identification strategies. 
The average stock price synchronicity measure for all firms in the sample is -0.369 (see 
Table 4), which is similar to the -0.232 reported by Gul et al. (2010), but much larger than the -
1.742 reported by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) for U.S. firms.
20
 The rather small difference 
from Gul et al. (2010), who also analyze Chinese companies, presumably stems from the 
deviation in time periods, and the restriction to only the three industries possibly related to REEs 
in our sample. We attribute the difference from Piotroski and Roulstone’s (2004) results to 
differences in stock price synchronicity in emerging versus mature stock markets. 
– Please insert Table 4 about here – 
In a univariate setting, we compare the stock price synchronicity measure of REE 
companies before and after the WTO event, as calculated in Equation (7). We test whether it 
significantly decreased after the WTO event by using t-tests. A decrease in stock price 
synchronicity implies that the REE companies co-move to a lesser extent with market- and 
industrywide information, and therefore exhibit more firm-specific information. This notion is 
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 Comparing the means for the other firm-specific characteristics in our sample with the means reported in Gul et al. 
(2010), we find that only 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 and 𝑀/𝐵 appear to differ. The mean 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 in our sample of 3.560 is higher 
than the 1.245 found by Gul et al. (2010), which can be explained by the fact that trading volume in Chinese stocks 
increased over the years. The 𝑀/𝐵 in our sample is also higher, which could be attributable to the use of different 
sample industries and different time periods in the analysis. Furthermore, Gul et al. (2010) divide by total net assets 












statistically supported by the evidence in Table 5, which shows that the stock price synchronicity 
of REE companies decreased after the WTO event. 
We observe the strongest support in terms of statistical significance when we compare the 
2.5 years before the WTO event with the 2.5 years afterward, where the t-statistics range 
from -1.402 to -9.743 (see column [Pre; Post] in Table 5). The “weakest” support is provided for 
the shortest time period (one year) after the WTO event (see column [-1; +1] in Table 5). This 
makes sense intuitively, because we cannot expect stock price synchronicity to change with a 
similar speed as stock returns, which can incorporate new information instantaneously. Stock 
price synchronicity is measured only once a year in a regression framework, which means that, if 
synchronicity is changing with a certain delay to the WTO event, the change will be less 
pronounced in the subsequent year. This will be reflected by lower t-statistics (in absolute terms). 
Thus, the change in synchronicity is expected to be slow or creeping. This view is supported by 
the fact that the t-statistics increase almost monotonically the more distant the post-WTO period 
is from the WTO event (compare columns [-1; +1], [-1; +2], and [Pre; Post] from top to down in 
Table 5). 
Note that these results are less pronounced when using the REE indices based on China 
prices instead of FOB prices to identify companies in the REE industry. They are also statistically 
insignificant for the examination one year after the WTO event (see column [-1; +1] in Table 5). 
We argue that this may be attributable to a less precise selection of companies in the REE 
industry, because, for Chinese companies, FOB prices are more relevant for stock price 
movements. Consider the following explanatory examples: As FOB prices are always higher than 
China prices, an increase in FOB prices would be even more important for REE mining 
companies that export REEs and could thus generate additional revenue. Moreover, REE user 












their end-products a competitive advantage. Both effects, however, are captured less than 
completely in the selection process, because the REE indices are based on China prices. 
In summary, we interpret our univariate results as strong support for the notion that stock 
price synchronicity (informativeness) decreased (increased) significantly after the WTO event. 
The results are arguably stronger when FOB-based REE indices for REE company identification 
are used, and when the comparison period after the WTO event is further from the event to allow 
the synchronicity measure to better unfold. 
– Please insert Table 5 about here – 
Despite this univariate evidence, we have not yet controlled for other alternative 
explanations, such as a general regressive tendency of stock price synchronicity in the Chinese 
market due, e.g., to higher transparency or enforcement, or for firm characteristics such as 
company size. In the multivariate DiD analyses, we aim to isolate the effect of changes in stock 
price synchronicity for REECs in response to the WTO event, and to then control for other 
potentially influencing factors. 
Table 7 shows the regression results for OLS regressions that explain stock price 
synchronicity (including firm-specific controls and time fixed effects).
21
 We are primarily 
interested in the coefficients for the variables 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 and 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 
(the DiD coefficients).
22
 The interaction between the pre-WTO dummy variable and 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 is 
statistically significantly positive for all specifications at the 5% and 1% levels (t-statistics range 
from 2.17 to 4.51, for 10, 15, and 50 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝑠, equally or usage-weighted REE index based on 
FOB prices). This means that stock price synchronicity for REECs before the WTO event was 
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 Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for all variables used in the multivariate analyses. 
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 The multivariate results correspond to the univariate evidence. To clarify, the corresponding univariate results are 
framed with dotted lines in Table 5. Specifications (1)-(3) are the multivariate pendants of the univariate results from 
Table 5 in panel (A), Equally Weighted FOB REE Index, for a selection period of two years before the WTO event 
and a [Pre; Post] comparison. Similarly, specifications (4)-(6) are the multivariate pendants of the univariate results 
from Table 5 in panel (C), Usage-Weighted FOB REE Index, for a selection period of two years before the WTO 












statistically higher than for non-REECs in the same industries. This effect could be attributed to 
the previously discussed aggressive governmental regulation that REECs face, for example, the 
setting of export quotas with the so-called MOFCOM announcements. However, the coefficient 
on the interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 is negative and statistically significant at least on a 
10% level in all specifications (t-statistics range from -1.88 to -3.33). This suggests that the WTO 
event caused a significant drop (increase) in stock price synchronicity (informativeness) for 
𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝑠 relative to non-REECs in the same industries. 
The signs of our controlling variables are in line with those reported in related works. We 
find a statistically significantly positive relationship between firm size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) and stock price 
synchronicity on a 1% level for all specifications, which means that larger companies in China 
are tied more to market and industry developments than comparable smaller companies (see Chan 
and Hameed, 2006; and Gul et al., 2010). Furthermore, 𝑀/𝐵 is statistically negative at a 10% 
level for all specifications, implying that companies with more growth options convey more firm-
specific information and thus have higher stock price informativeness (see Gul et al., 2010). 
Finally, our control variable for government ownership (𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣) reveals that 
government control is negatively correlated with proper governance and with weaker shareholder 
protection (managerial entrenchment), which leads to higher stock price synchronicity (see 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; and Gul et al., 2010). This effect is also present in our results by a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient at a 1% level in all specifications. 
– Please insert Tables 6 and 7 about here – 
We conclude this section with a few robustness checks. First, we apply alternative 
estimation strategies to test for robustness of the OLS regressions in Table 7. One concern with 
using OLS regressions is that the stock price synchronicity measure is rather sticky over time and 












regressions with Newey-West (1987) standard errors and lag(1) (see panel A of Table 8, which 
replicates our main model from Table 7). Note that the signs and the t-statistics for both DiD 
coefficients are comparable to those in Table 7, suggesting that potential autocorrelation in the 
stock price synchronicity measure does not affect our results.
23
 
Next, we use a panel regression random effects estimator with robust standard errors (see 
panel B of Table 8). The results are highly similar in terms of magnitude to able 7 and to panel 
A of Table 8, although the power of our tests decreases. We again find negative coefficients for 
the interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 and positive coefficients for 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶, but 
the latter is no longer statistically significant when we restrict the number of companies in the 
REE industry to ten. However, the negative coefficient on 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 remains 
statistically significant at least at the 10% level (except for ten REECs and when the usage-
weighted REE index based on FOB prices serves as the selection criteria). Our basic statement, 
that 𝛽1 > 𝛽2, therefore remains unchanged, and we are confident that the alternative estimation 
strategies do not alter our previous evidence that stock price synchronicity of REECs declined 
significantly after the WTO event.
24
 
– Please insert Table 8 about here – 
Second, we test the robustness of our results with regard to the selection criteria to 
identify REECs by using an REE index based on China prices rather than FOB prices (see Table 
A.4 in the appendix). The univariate evidence already shows that the results from using China 
prices are much weaker, presumably following the previous argument that FOB prices are more 
relevant for stock price formation. Therefore, we expect this property to be reflected in the 
multivariate results as well. However, we again find a statistically significant negative coefficient 
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 In unreported results, we changed the lags to two and three, and our results are virtually the same. The 
corresponding table is available from the authors upon request. 
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 Note that we do not apply Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimators because it would be in opposition to the DiD 












(at least at a 5% level) for the interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 identifying fifty REECs, 
whether we apply OLS, Newey-West standard errors, or a random effects estimator. If we 
consider only portfolios of 25 or 10 companies, both DiD coefficients are largely insignificant, 
but their predicted signs remain. 
Despite the insignificant results for the smaller REEC portfolios, we interpret this 
robustness check as further support for our prediction that the stock price synchronicity of REECs 
declined after the WTO event for three reasons: 1) We argued that China REE prices are less 
precise than FOB prices, a fact that we expect to translate into decreased power for our test 
statistics, 2) We consider using only 10 REECs as the strictest test. This is because some 
companies that should obviously be classified as REECs have presumably been attributed to the 
group of non-REECs (as Müller et al., 2016, for example, already identified 14 REE mining and 
refining companies). This leads to reason 3), that, with an increase in REECs, the t-statistics for 
the interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 increase almost monotonically, supporting the idea that 
more than 10 or 25 companies are active in the REE industry. 
Third, synchronicity assumes equal effects on the upside and the downside. Thus, there 
could be an effect from, e.g., a distinct bull or bear market. To address this concern, we already 
included year fixed effects in the regression that capture potentially asymmetric effects in a 
particular year. In unreported results, we also narrowed it to include “half-year” fixed effects, 
because bull and bear trends do not necessarily span an entire year. Our results remain virtually 
unchanged. 
Fourth, there could be further control variables that are related to stock price 
synchronicity for which we have not controlled. We extend the set of control variables by the 
following: a) auditors (see Chen et al., 2013), b) political connections (see Xu et al., 2015; Wu et 












Cumming and Hou, 2014; and Cumming et al., 2016), d) financial analysts (see Chen et al., 
2016), and e) corporate governance and ownership (see Bai et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2006; Liu 
and Lu, 2007; and Schweizer et al., 2017, 2018). 
For media coverage, we use the following indirect measures, which are strongly 
correlated with actual media coverage (see Cumming et al., 2016): measured size, percentage 
change in sales growth over the last fiscal year, ownership concentration in the last fiscal year, 
and executive ownership.
25
 After re-running the same regression including the additional control 
variables, we find that the magnitude of our main coefficient of interest,  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶, 
does not change much in the various specifications (see Tables A.5 and A.6). In absolute terms, 
the 𝑡-statistics are higher for some specifications and lower for others, but there is no pattern of 
consistent reduction in the 𝑡-statistics or the magnitude of the coefficient for our main variables 
due to the inclusion of the new variables. However, the inclusion of such a large number of 
control variables increased the Variance Inflation Factors, because some of the new variables are 
correlated with previous and newly added control variables, which was not the case before and 
could be interpreted as a sign of multicollinearity. Furthermore, we find that the inclusion of the 
new control variables reduces the adjusted R2 by about 1 percentage point. In summary, we find 
that our main results remain stable and robust after the inclusion of the new control variables. 
In summary, we present robust evidence that the stock price informativeness of REECs 
increased compared to non-REECs after the March 13, 2012, announcement of the U.S., EU, and 
Japan bringing a dispute resolution case against China to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
We interpret this result to mean that, after the beginning of the WTO trial, the Chinese 
government’s influence on the REE market (by, e.g., MOFCOM announcements) decreased. The 
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 A direct measure for media coverage, such as that used in Cumming et al. (2016), is the cleanest way to control for 
this potential influence. Given that the indirect measures had no impact on the main results or the explanatory power 













MOFCOM announcements were typically used biannually to set the maximum amount of REEs 
for export, and they were generally thought to increase the value of Chinese stocks. The export 
quotas are generally not known to shareholders; thus, stock prices react in response to the 
announcement. This provides an opportunity for company insiders to trade on a private 
information advantage, especially for companies with high levels of state ownership and close 
ties to the government. Consequently, this should be reflected in higher (lower) stock price 
synchronicity (informativeness) of REE companies. It seems that, after the beginning of the WTO 
trial, the Chinese government was more reluctant to set “unexpected” export quotas, and did tend 
to intervene less in the REE market. We consider this as an explanation for the increase in stock 
price informativeness of REE companies after the WTO event. 
4.5 Derivatives Pricing 
This subsection provides empirical evidence for changes in the option price differences 
among various option pricing models before and after the WTO event. If the WTO event caused 
less intervention by the Chinese government, such as the removal of REE export quotas, we 
expect that the price-generating process for REEs will become less “erratic,” which will be 
echoed by lower pricing differences between models.
26
 
For the “static” comparison in Table 9, we observe that the absolute pricing differences 
(𝑃𝐷) for all REEs between all option pricing models before the WTO event (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂) are 
considerably higher than after (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂) the event (except for one case, for Ce between the 
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 Commodity options are commonly based on related futures contracts instead of on spot prices, such as the 
underlying. The dynamics of futures prices are determined by, not only the spot price, but also by the convenience 
yield (or “availability” premium) and the interest rate. The stochastic process modeling of the convenience yield has 
an impact on the option value if the convenience yield is modeled with, e.g., constant correlation (see, for example, 
Gibson and Schwartz, 1990), non-constant correlation to the spot price (e.g., Routledge et al., 2000), or the spot price 
and the interest rate (Casassus and Collin-Dufresne, 2005). In the following, we base our calculations on only the 
spot price dynamics, for practical reasons. As mentioned in the introduction, no futures contracts on REEs are yet 
available, which would allow us to specify the dynamics of the convenience yield and the correlation with the spot 
price and the interest rate. Therefore, any exogenous and presumably inaccurate assumptions will most likely not 
improve the quality of our results. Furthermore, our “difference-in-differences” approach can cope with this quality 












Black-Scholes (1973) and Duan (1995) models). For example, the aggregate absolute pricing 
difference for La for call options between the Black-Scholes (1973) and Duan (1995) models, 
given all strike price and time to maturity combinations, is 106.24 before the WTO event, and 
26.39 afterward. This represents a 79.84 decrease, or, in relative terms, an approximately 75.16% 
decrease (see column (2) of Tables 9 and 10 for detailed calculations corresponding to the values 
framed by the dotted lines and shaded in grey for lanthanum in Table 9). The total absolute 
pricing difference for all option pricing models for La call options is 230.76 before the WTO 
event, and 55.11 afterward. This represents a 175.65 decrease, or a similar relative decrease of 
76.12% (see column (1) of Tables 9 and 10). The decrease for the total absolute pricing 
difference for call options for cerium, neodymium, and yttrium range from 63% to 79% (see 
column (1) of Table 9). For put options, the effect is stronger for all REEs. 
In Fig. 3, we present the above-described evidence from a graphical representation point 
of view for call options, based on lanthanum. Panel A presents the absolute call option price 
differences based on the Black-Scholes (1973) and Duan (1995) models for various strike price 
and time to maturity combinations. Column (1) shows the call option price differences before the 
WTO event (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂), and column (2) shows them afterward (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂). Both figures 
illustrate similar behavior, namely, that the absolute call option price differences are larger for 
longer maturities and for at-the-money prices (e.g., the strike price is equal to the current 
lanthanum price). However, absolute pricing differences are lower in the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 period 
compared to the period beforehand. This is reflected by the negative differences between absolute 
pricing differences between the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡- and 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 periods (see column (3) in Fig. 3). We can 
interpret this result similarly as the previously mentioned 175.65 pricing decrease for lanthanum 












Qualitatively similar figures are presented for the absolute call option price differences 
between Black-Scholes (1973) and Heston and Nandi (2000) in panel B. The results in panels A 
and B reveal that absolute pricing differences are consistently lower after the WTO event. 
However, for panel C, where the absolute call option price differences between Duan (1995) and 
Heston and Nandi (2000) are compared, we do not find a similar relationship between the pricing 
difference and different times to maturity and strike prices. From a visual inspection, it seems that 
the pricing differences after the WTO event are smaller than those for 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 and are of lower 
magnitude, which can also be seen in column (4) in Table 9. 
– Please insert Tables 9 and 10 and Figure 3 about here – 
From the “static” DiD comparison, we find strong support for the notion that the pricing 
differences among the different option pricing models are substantially lower after the WTO 
event than before it (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 period). For the “static” DiD between the three option pricing 
models we find that pricing differences for call options for the four REEs decrease between 
63.14% (neodymium) and 79.56% (yttrium) and for put options between 83.59% (neodymium) 
and 91.95% (yttrium). This decrease between the option pricing models is quite large and 
economically significant, especially for put options where the pricing difference can be 
marginalized for some REEs after the WTO dispute resolution case commences. This underpins 
our argumentation that the model risk for pricing derivatives on REEs decreased in response to 
the WTO event. However, as outlined in the methodology section, the static approach is not 
suitable from which to draw conclusions about statistical inference. It also focuses solely on 
option price calculations for two particular days. 
To overcome these issues, we use a consecutive “triple-difference” (DDD) methodology 
that can rule out constant unobserved differences among REE pricing behavior during the 𝑃𝑟𝑒- 












approach used previously. If the WTO event had a positive impact on the price behavior of REEs 
so that it reduced option pricing model uncertainty, we would expect to find a larger drop in 
option price differences among models during the “treatment” and “control” periods, implying 
𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂) > 𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂), and resulting in a positive 
DDD on average. This is consistently observed for all possible strike prices, times to maturity, 
and option model comparisons for lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium (see Table 11).
27
 These 
differences result in highly statistically significant positive DDDs, with 𝑡-statistics ranging from 
2.84 to 20.62. However, similarly to the “static” DiD, we fail to find a consistent decrease in 
option price differences among all models after the WTO event for cerium. We can summarize 
the results for our comparison of price differences for the Black-Scholes (1973) and Duan (1995) 
models as inconsistent. But the comparisons among Black-Scholes (1973), Duan (1995), and 
Heston and Nandi (2000) indicate that the pricing differences decreased significantly after the 
WTO event (see again Table 11). For example, for lanthanum, we find that the option model 
pricing difference drops on average between 30% and 42% during the event period relative to the 
period before the WTO event. This drop is dependent on the respective comparison of the option 
pricing models, which is arguably economically meaningful. 
In summary, we find compelling evidence from the static DiD and from the consecutive 
DDD approach that pricing differences among different option pricing models decreased 
significantly after the WTO event, not only statistically but also economically. We interpret this 
to mean that the influence of the WTO on the Chinese government triggered somewhat fewer 
interventions on the REE market. This is reflected afterward in less erratic price behavior of 
REEs, which we expect to facilitate the introduction of derivatives exchanges on REEs. 
– Please insert Table 11 about here – 
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 For the sake of clarity, the following presents results only for call options, because results for put options are 













Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the economic implications of dispute 
resolution cases brought to the WTO. The literature thus far has focused mainly on the stock 
price reactions of affected companies in a classical event study setting (see Liebman, 2006; 
Liebman and Tomlin, 2007, 2008, 2015; and Desai and Hines Jr., 2008). However, we choose a 
different approach, and use the commencement of the WTO dispute resolution case on March 13, 
2012 as a natural experiment in order to highlight its effects from four different angles. 
First, we use variance ratio tests to show that price formation on the REE market is not 
efficient, in the sense that the prices are random processes. However, after the initiation of the 
WTO dispute resolution case, the magnitude of the variance ratios is considerably lower. Hence, 
this means that even the announcement of a WTO dispute resolution case seems to have 
“efficiency-enhancing effects” with respect to the price formation of REEs. This is in line with 
the notion of using variance ratio tests to study the potential enhancement of market efficiency in 
other contexts. Examples include the liberalization of investment restrictions on B shares in the 
Chinese stock market (see Hung, 2009), the opening of Asian stock markets and the 
unprecedented inflow of funds into these markets after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (see 
Hoque et al., 2007), and the analysis of crude oil market efficiency over time (see Tabak and 
Cajueiro, 2007). 
Second, we use structural change tests and find that the price processes of REEs exhibit a 
significant change in dynamics around the announcement date of the dispute resolution case. 
However, there may have been some foreshadowing, or anticipation, of the launch of a WTO 
dispute resolution case about REEs from prior WTO rulings against China in other commodity-
related trials in 2009 (see Bond and Trachtman, 2016). Nevertheless, we find that a WTO trial 












investors had foreseen the start of the WTO resolution case against China, logically, we would 
have expected them to rationally adjust their expectations accordingly. Thus, we would not have 
been able to document significant effects. This is also supported by the Google Trends Index for 
REEs, which had shown a consistent decline in interest in REEs prior to 2010, followed by a 
huge spike at the time of the WTO trial announcement (see Fig. A.2 in the appendix and Choi 
and Varian, 2009, 2012, for further insights into Google Trends). 
Third, we study the impact of the WTO event on the information content of stock prices 
and find that stock price informativeness significantly increases for companies that are active in 
the REE industry relative to firms from other industries. Because the Chinese government 
ultimately presumably ceased intervening in the REE market at least to a certain extent due to the 
start of the WTO trial, firm-specific information became more important than marketwide 
information. 
Moreover, as new trading venues for spot and futures markets emerge, such as the Baotou 
Rare Earth Products Exchange, and the potential trading of derivatives on these elements on the 
Shanghai Futures Exchange gears up (Shen, 2014), investors and regulators need to understand 
the price processes of REEs more deeply. Accordingly, fourth, we compare the results of three 
different option valuation models, i.e., Black-Scholes (1973), Duan (1995), and Heston and 
Nandi (2000). Note that we are not interested in determining the best option pricing model in 
order to minimize pricing errors (recall that the introduction of REE derivatives has not 
materialized yet). Rather, we compare pricing differences among the three models before and 
after the launch of the WTO case. We show that the differences among prices calculated from the 
three frameworks are much larger during the pre-WTO period than after the launch of the WTO 
trial. We interpret this finding as another indication that the WTO event triggered important 












Overall, we document compelling evidence that the announcement of a WTO dispute trial 
can influence the stock prices of potentially affected companies (Desai and Hines Jr., 2008), as 
well as induce governmental changes in existing policies. While previous research found the 
WTO’s enforcement mechanism to be somewhat ineffective (see Liebman and Tomlin, 2015),28 
we show that even the announcement of a trial can trigger economically significant changes in 
the REE market. 
Thus, we provide first evidence for the notion that governments accused of violating 
GATT react to the announcement with “measurable” policy changes even before an official WTO 
ruling. This implies that the launch of a WTO case itself helps to resolve uncertainty, while in 
other legal cases, such as class action lawsuits, uncertainty tends to increase after the 
commencement of a case. This has important implications for investors and policy makers alike: 
The WTO is far from being a paper tiger. In fact, faced with the potential suspension of 
concessions and retaliatory threats, the compliance rate is well above 80% (Bekhar, 2010). Thus, 
governments take into account the costs of dispute settlement, and hence take the rulings of the 
WTO seriously (see the theoretical bargaining game, as well as the empirical evidence presented 
in Sattler et al., 2014). Accordingly, investors of affected companies and industries should 
carefully monitor WTO trials in order to ensure they are positioned correctly. 
Our study also serves as an impetus for further research. Once the planned introduction of 
options on REEs is realized, one could use step 4 in our Fig. 1 to analyze the impact of a 
derivatives market on the spot market in regard to volatility, bid-ask spread, and liquidity (see 
Conrad, 1989; Skinner, 1989; Detemple and Jorion, 1990; Kumar et al., 1998; and Danielsen et 
                                                          
28
 Note that even in the case of Byrd subsidies, as analyzed by Liebman and Tomlin (2015), the policy in question 
(Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, CDSOA), which was criticized by the WTO, was eventually ended. 
Moreover, firms in industries with higher export orientations exhibit positive share price reactions with respect to the 
WTO’s ruling that the CDSOA policy is illegal. Likewise, the U.S. firms facing retaliation from U.S. trade partners 
exhibit negative share price reactions. Accordingly, the claim that the WTO’s enforcement mechanism is ineffective 












al., 2007). However, as derivatives are unavailable so far, policy makers should consider building 
strategic stockpiles as a way to secure access to rare earth elements and shield user industries 
from price peaks and volatility (Bailey Grasso, 2013; and Humphries, 2013). Research from other 
high-risk commodity markets such as copper provides some guidance in that respect. Athanasiou 
et al. (2008), for example, show how to analytically derive a solution for the computation of the 
storage capacity as well as for the cost of a potential buffer stock program. 
Moreover, the bankruptcy of Molycorp highlights how important it is for the REE 
industry to have a fuller understanding of what drives REE prices. At its peak, approximately 
four years ago, Molycorp’s stock was trading at USD $79.16. Before filing for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection, it was down to about USD $0.36 (see McCarty and Casey, 2015; and 
Reuters, 2015). Therefore, future research could explore the impact of macroeconomic factors 
such as exchange rates, interest rates, and the business cycle on REE prices and on REECs (see 
Faff and Chan, 1998; Tufano, 1998; Boyer and Filion, 2007; Baur, 2014; and Gil-Alana and 
Yaya, 2014, for related research on the gold and oil markets). 
Due to the often-extreme price movements of REEs, future research may also want to 
concentrate on volatility modeling and prediction (see Batten et al., 2010; and Haugom et al., 
2014, for the oil and metal markets) as well as risk management approaches. Extreme Value 
Theory (EVT)-based procedures successfully employed in other commodity markets might serve 
as a starting point for risk management applications (see, for example, Marimoutou et al., 2009; 
Aloui et al., 2014; Koch, 2014; and Herrera et al., 2017). It is well known that failing to account 
for the fact that distributions of asset returns can substantially deviate from the normal due to fat 
tails can greatly underestimate risk measures such as value at risk (VaR). Risk measures that 
focus on the tails, such as expected shortfall, may hence be more suitable for REEs (see the 












The evidence concerning the WTO’s enforcement power is far from being conclusive 
(see, for example, the evidence presented in Liebman and Tomlin, 2015). In order to foster our 
understanding of the economic importance of requests for consultations at the WTO, the evidence 
presented in this paper needs to be broadened. Accordingly, the effects on the claimant as well as 
the accused countries need to be investigated using a cross-section of cases. It may be true that 
the effects depend on which country files the complaint and which country is accused. 
For example, while the U.S. is the dominant economy in terms of GDP, the export sector 
is far less important for its industry: In 1970, exports of goods and services were 5.55% of GDP; 
this figure grew to 11.89% in 2016. This contrasts with China (Germany), who were able to 
increase their share of exports to GDP from 2.49% (15.17%) in 1970 to 19.64% (46.12%) in 
2016, respectively (see Fig. A.3 in the Online Appendix). 
Moreover, while this paper analyzes in-depth the impact of the launch of a dispute 
resolution case at the WTO, it might be worthwhile to analyze the different stages from the 
request for consultations to the final release of the report of the Appellate Body and the 
authorization of retaliatory measures (as in Liebman and Tomlin, 2015) in a classical event study 
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Illustration of the DiD and DDD Approaches 
 
















Illustration of the DiD and DDD Approaches – continued 
 




Fig. 2. This figure provides a visual approach toward evaluating the effect of the WTO trial on option pricing model uncertainty. Panel A shows the time line and 












Option Price Differences between Option Pricing Models before and after the WTO Event (Lanthanum; Call Options) 
 
Panel A: Call Option Price Differences between Black-Scholes (1973) and Duan (1995) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 (1) 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 (2) 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 (3) 
   
 
Panel B: Call Option Price Differences between Black-Scholes (1973) and Heston and Nandi (2000)  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 (1) 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 (2) 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 (3) 













Option Price Differences between Option Pricing Models before and after the WTO Event (Lanthanum; Call Options) – continued 
 
Panel C: Call Option Price Differences between Duan (1995) and Heston and Nandi (2000)  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 (1) 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 (2) 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 (3) 
   
 
Fig. 3. This figure shows the pricing differences for different combinations of time to maturity and moneyness for lanthanum call options. Panel A (Panel B) 
[Pancel C] shows the differences between the option pricing models of Black and Scholes (1973) and Duan (1995) (Black and Scholes (1973) and Heston and 













Descriptive Statistics of REE Prices – Weekly Base Observation Period 
 
Element  Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
Panel A: (PreWTO) 
Lanthanum FOB 52.57 49.95 45.54 0.65 2.24 4.05 140.05 
 China 10.46 4.43 8.11 0.65 1.61 3.22 25.44 
Cerium FOB 51.47 41.50 47.02 0.78 2.50 3.35 150.55 
 China 11.29 4.80 9.79 0.64 1.68 2.42 29.02 
Neodymium FOB 136.97 85.75 113.44 0.58 1.91 14.65 369.75 
 China 76.35 39.01 65.60 1.05 2.94 12.45 232.91 
Yttrium FOB 120.89 125.00 45.63 -0.14 1.77 42.50 197.50 
 China 23.55 7.61 21.96 0.88 2.36 5.78 77.16 
Panel B: (PostWTO) 
Lanthanum FOB 11.62 7.55 7.59 1.04 2.50 5.20 30.50 
 China 6.62 4.85 3.56 0.79 2.32 2.61 14.44 
Cerium FOB 11.51 7.55 7.64 0.99 2.37 4.20 28.50 
 China 6.60 4.85 3.63 0.73 2.23 2.36 14.68 
Neodymium FOB 81.58 74.50 21.23 1.76 5.55 59.50 146.00 
 China 57.35 53.80 11.69 1.30 3.95 41.96 88.65 
Yttrium FOB 47.91 24.00 46.80 1.61 4.32 13.00 185.00 
 China 14.80 12.09 7.06 0.94 2.87 6.62 33.96 
 
This table presents the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, minimum, and maximum of the time 
series of weekly REE FOB (foreign) and China (domestic) prices. Panel A (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂) shows the prices for 
individual REEs for the period beginning thirty months prior to the WTO dispute resolution case on March 13, 2012. 
Due to data availability, the FOB prices for yttrium begin in ugust 2010. Panel B (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂) shows the prices for 
the period up to thirty months after the WTO event. Price data comes from the Asian Metal database; all calculations 













Variance Ratio Tests – Weekly Base Observation Period  
 
Panel A  Number 𝑞 of base observations aggregated to form variance ratio 
Element   2 4 8 16 
Lanthanum FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.401 1.997 2.816 4.112 
   (3.024)*** (4.437)*** (6.036)*** (8.597)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.274 1.641 1.998 2.897 
   (2.011)** (2.648)*** (2.926)*** (3.984)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -9.02% -17.83% -29.04% -29.54% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.485 2.283 3.520 5.208 
   (2.467)** (3.926)*** (5.877)*** (8.259)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.227 1.659 2.477 3.778 
   (2.611) (4.048) (5.738)* (7.252) 
  Rel. Dif. -17.36% -27.34% -29.61% -27.45% 
Cerium FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.296 1.815 2.473 3.522 
   (3.537)*** (4.232)*** (5.229)*** (7.307)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.348 1.761 2.027 2.669 
   (2.550)** (3.171)*** (3.121)*** (3.730)*** 
  Rel. Dif. 4.06% -2.93% -18.06% -24.22% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.450 2.301 3.744 5.602 
   (3.304)*** (5.250)*** (7.506)*** (9.936)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.112 1.453 1.955 2.375 
   (1.190) (2.523)** (3.430)*** (3.365)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -23.34% -36.83% -47.78% -57.60% 
Neodymium FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.336 2.006 2.936 4.323 
   (6.526)*** (8.848)*** (10.875)*** (13.444)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.405 1.811 2.211 2.257 
   (1.788)* (2.316)** (2.835)*** (2.502)** 
  Rel. Dif. 5.19% -9.722% -24.674% -47.791% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.584 2.542 3.829 5.741 
   (6.828)*** (10.070)*** (12.831)*** (15.996)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.466 2.000 2.257 2.266 
   (2.950)*** (3.984)*** (3.663)*** (2.822)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -7.44% -21.33% -41.06% -60.53% 
Yttrium FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.470 2.198 3.166 4.554 
   (4.394)*** (6.573)*** (8.637)*** (10.628)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.345 1.786 2.176 3.211 
   (2.976)*** (3.858)*** (4.075)*** (5.419)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -8.51% -18.73% -31.26% -29.50% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.359 2.123 3.166 4.645 
   (3.044)*** (4.843)*** (6.665)*** (8.926)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.151 1.511 1.760 1.548 
   (1.211) (2.412)** (2.603)*** (1.358) 
  Rel. Dif. -15.34% -28.82% -44.40% -66.67% 












Table 2 – continued 
 
Panel B  Number 𝑞 of base observations aggregated to form variance ratio 
Element   2 4 8 16 
Lanthanum FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.434 2.215 3.455 5.480 
   (10.250)*** (15.352)*** (19.623)*** (24.062)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.182 1.434 1.653 1.947 
   (2.085)** (2.668)*** (2.536)*** (2.471)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -17.58% -35.24% -52.16% -64.47% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.330 1.984 3.279 5.643 
   (7.400)*** (11.810)*** (17.297)*** (22.762)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.140 1.400 1.818 2.016 
   (1.614) (2.459)** (3.176)*** (2.652)*** 
       
  Rel. Dif. -14.22% -29.42% -44.56% -64.27% 
Cerium FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.416 2.300 3.201 4.881 
   (9.835)*** (13.896)*** (17.594)*** (20.845)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.267 1.617 1.852 1.963 
   (3.062)*** (3.789)*** (3.311)*** (2.515)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -10.56% -22.98% -42.13% -59.79% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.394 2.163 3.626 6.028 
   (8.848)*** (13.957)*** (19.930)*** (25.646)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.097 1.329 1.693 1.878 
   (1.115) (2.018)** (2.692)*** (2.292)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -21.30% -38.58% -53.30% -68.85% 
Neodymium FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.555 2.491 3.737 5.645 
   (13.115)*** (18.838)*** (21.880)*** (24.948)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.284 1.594 1.790 1.764 
   (3.261)*** (3.650)*** (3.070)*** (1.994)** 
  Rel. Dif. -17.43% -35.98% -52.10% -68.75% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.617 2.656 4.053 5.890 
   (13.857)*** (19.872)*** (23.167)*** (24.940)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.422 1.975 2.15 1.444 
   (4.845)*** (5.987)*** (4.484)*** (1.158) 
  Rel. Dif. -12.09% -25.64% -46.83% -75.49% 
Yttrium FOB 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.501 2.301 3.329 4.486 
   (7.327)*** (10.172)*** (11.517)*** (11.586)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.337 1.741 1.990 2.543 
   (3.868)*** (4.553)*** (3.846)*** (4.026)*** 
  Rel. Dif. -10.94% -24.31% -40.21% -43.32% 
 China 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.404 2.142 3.376 5.249 
   (9.080)*** (13.704)*** (18.031)*** (21.671)*** 
  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 1.217 1.601 1.866 1.468 
   (2.489)** (3.691)*** (3.362)*** (1.220) 
  Rel. Dif. -13.37% -25.25% -44.74% -72.04% 
 
This table presents the results for the Lo and MacKinlay (1988) (panel A) and Wright (2000) (panel B) variance 
ratio tests of the random walk hypothesis. The variance ratios ?̅?𝑟(𝑞) + 1 are presented in the main rows, and the 
heteroscedasticity-robust test statistic 𝑧∗(𝑞) is presented in brackets. Under the null hypothesis that REE prices 
follow a random walk, the value of the variance ratio is 1. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 shows the results for the period beginning thirty months prior to the 
WTO event on March 13, 2012. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 shows results for the period up to thirty months after the WTO event. 
Due to data availability, FOB prices for Y begin in August 2010. Price data comes from the Asian Metal database; 
all calculations based on USD/kg. Rel. Dif. is the relative difference between the variance ratio before and after the 













Multiple Structural Change Test 
 
   Break Dates 
Element  sup𝐹(ℓ + 1|ℓ) 𝑚 = 1 𝑚 = 2 𝑚 = 3 𝑚 = 4 𝑚 = 5 
Lanthanum FOB 4 
(44.84)* 
2010:30 2012:10 2007:41 2006:09 - 
 China 3 
(50.38)* 
2011:10 2008:07 2012:33 - - 
Cerium FOB 3 
(126.27)* 
2010:29 2012:09 2007:21 - - 
 China 4 
(63.19)* 
2011:06 2012:29 2009:36 2008:13 - 
Neodymium FOB 3 
(42.22)* 
2010:33 2012:18 2006:30 - - 
 China 4 
(15.55)* 
2011:05 2012:28 2006:29 2009:35 - 
Yttrium FOB 5 
(34.14)* 
2012:36 2011:12 2011:44 2013:16 2014:07 
 China 4 
(27.94)* 
2011:08 2012:31 2007:27 2008:50 - 
 
This table presents the results of the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, 2003b) multiple structural change test allowing 
for serial correlation in the error terms and heterogeneous error distributions across breaks. We use the 
heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix based on Andrews (1991) and Andrews and 
Monahan (1992) with a quadratic-spectral kernel and automatic bandwidth selection. Following Bai and Perron’s 
(2003a, 2003b) recommendations, we select the number of breaks and the break dates using the sequential 
sup𝐹(ℓ + 1|ℓ) test. The number of breaks is shown in the main rows and the test statistic is shown in brackets, 
where * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level (see Bai and Perron, 2003a, 2003b). All results are based 
on weekly REE prices for the January 2, 2004-September 30, 2014 period. Due to data availability, the observation 
periods differ for some REEs: For FOB prices of La, Ce, and Nd, the time series begin in January 2004. The FOB 
prices for Y begin in August 2010. For China prices of Y, La, Ce, and Nd, the time series begin in January 2005. 
All time series end in September 2014. Price data comes from the Asian Metal database; all calculations based on 













Descriptive Statistics for Stock Price Synchronicity and Firm Characteristics 
 





25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 95th Pctl. 
𝑺𝒀𝑵𝑪𝑯 4,307 -0.369 0.638 -1.505 -0.736 -0.319 0.067 0.594 
𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝑮𝒐𝒗 4,307 0.093 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.514 
𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆 4,307 3.560 2.553 0.658 1.707 2.895 4.774 8.717 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 4,307 22.167 1.307 20.405 21.278 21.971 22.862 24.656 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 4,307 0.489 0.195 0.161 0.351 0.493 0.628 0.786 
𝑺𝒕𝒅(𝑹𝒐𝑨)) 4,307 0.036 0.063 0.005 0.013 0.023 0.041 0.100 
𝑴/𝑩 4,307 2.988 23.764 0.835 1.529 2.397 3.792 7.937 
𝑰𝒏𝒅_𝑵𝒖𝒎 4,307 6.154 0.835 4.691 6.510 6.532 6.532 6.532 
𝑰𝒏𝒅_𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 4,307 29.566 1.048 27.988 29.545 29.914 30.173 30.260 
 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 refers to the stock price synchronicity measure estimated using Equation (4) and transformed using Equation 













Change in Stock Price Synchronicity of REE Companies after the WTO Event – Univariate Evidence 
 
  
Panel A: Equally-Weighted FOB Panel B: Equally-Weighted China Panel C: Usage-Weighted FOB Panel D: Usage-Weighted China 
[𝜏1; 𝜏2] # REECs [-2] [-1] [Pre] [-2] [-1] [Pre] [-2] [-1] [Pre] [-2] [-1] [Pre] 
 
10 -0.573*** 0.062 -0.54*** 0.184 0.053 0.314* -0.784*** -0.201 -0.341 0.172 -0.214* 0.172 
  
(-2.509) (0.405) (-2.355) (1.119) (0.2) (1.426) (-4.072) (-1.191) (-1.312) (1.032) (-1.63) (0.844) 
[-1; +1] 
25 -0.444*** 0.048 -0.362*** 0.003 0.041 0.147 -0.311*** -0.096 -0.339*** 0.002 -0.122 0.228*** 
 
(-3.523) (0.42) (-2.788) (0.037) (0.342) (1.203) (-2.206) (-0.978) (-2.674) (0.015) (-1.242) (1.982) 
 
50 -0.303*** -0.057 -0.295*** 0.015 -0.081 0.007 -0.306*** -0.114* -0.252*** -0.029 -0.067 -0.018 
  
(-3.204) (-0.75) (-3.48) (0.208) (-0.928) (0.079) (-3.446) (-1.457) (-3.175) (-0.363) (-0.888) (-0.201) 
 
10 -0.676*** -0.249* -0.517*** -0.387*** 0.087 0.367* -0.771*** -0.466*** -0.344*** -0.38*** -0.247 0.059 
  
(-4.617) (-1.432) (-3.365) (-2.3) (0.291) (1.646) (-6.362) (-3.226) (-1.98) (-2.255) (-1.057) (0.398) 
[-1; +2] 
25 -0.602*** -0.332*** -0.452*** -0.444*** -0.151 -0.016 -0.572*** -0.543*** -0.479*** -0.504*** -0.393*** 0 
 
(-5.775) (-2.259) (-4.825) (-3.49) (-0.975) (-0.12) (-4.606) (-4.927) (-3.97) (-4.14) (-3.364) (0.001) 
 
50 -0.502*** -0.358*** -0.457*** -0.441*** -0.397*** -0.294*** -0.497*** -0.457*** -0.396*** -0.455*** -0.491*** -0.209*** 
  
(-5.456) (-3.97) (-5.642) (-4.969) (-3.927) (-3.007) (-5.278) (-5.424) (-4.767) (-5.678) (-4.953) (-2.262) 
 10 -0.676*** -0.309** -0.574*** -0.324*** -0.335*** -0.152* -0.779*** -0.385*** -0.393*** -0.362*** -0.362*** -0.167* 
  (-6.018) (-1.815) (-5.816) (-3.026) (-2.926) (-1.402) (-9.743) (-2.575) (-2.047) (-3.214) (-3.714) (-1.443) 
[Pre; Post] 
25 -0.618*** -0.319*** -0.491*** -0.388*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.573*** -0.437*** -0.485*** -0.435*** -0.354*** -0.18*** 
 
(-8.1) (-2.757) (-5.847) (-4.957) (-3.906) (-3.351) (-7.159) (-4.344) (-4.792) (-5.787) (-5.412) (-2.261) 
 
50 -0.558*** -0.23*** -0.445*** -0.385*** -0.388*** -0.365*** -0.498*** -0.377*** -0.415*** -0.399*** -0.376*** -0.29*** 
  
(-8.962) (-2.091) (-6.548) (-7.012) (-5.384) (-6.396) (-6.834) (-4.952) (-6.24) (-7.528) (-6.862) (-4.746) 
 
This table reports the changes in stock price synchronicity of REE companies (REECs) after the WTO event. REECs are identified by applying Equation (6) using 
four different REE indices for the four most important elements (Ce, La, Nd, and Y) to proxy for price developments in the REE market. The equally-weighted REE 
index based on FOB (foreign) prices is displayed in panel A, and China (domestic) prices are in panel B; the usage-weighted REE index based on FOB prices is 
displayed in panel C, and China prices are in panel D. The selection periods for the REECs are one year, two years, or the entire preWTO period. The periods [𝜏1; 𝜏2] 
for which we compare stock price synchronicity are [𝜏−1; 𝜏+1], [𝜏−1; 𝜏+2], and [𝜏𝑃𝑟𝑒; 𝜏𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡]. The changes in stock price synchronicity are calculated for portfolios of 














Correlation Matrix for Stock Price Synchronicity and Firm Characteristics 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻 1 
        
(2) 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣 0.1446* 1 
       
(3) 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 0.1156* -0.1032* 1 
      
(4) 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.1377* 0.1130* -0.4211* 1 
     
(5) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.0397* 0.0481* -0.0037 0.3183* 1 
    
(6) 𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑅𝑜𝐴)) -0.0308* 0.0571* 0.0047 -0.1548* 0.0239 1 
   
(7) 𝑀/𝐵 -0.0271 -0.0071 0.0365* -0.0247 -0.0289 0.0062 1 
  
(8) 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑁𝑢𝑚 -0.0087 -0.0664* -0.0259 0.0079 0.0433* 0.0159 0.0262 1 
 
(10) 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 -0.0907* -0.1096* -0.1259* 0.0628* 0.0147 -0.0099 0.0168 0.9438* 1 
 
This table gives Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables presented in Table 4. All variables are considered in subsequent analyses (see appendix A.2 for 

















Weighting  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
50  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 -0.170***      
   (-3.33)      
50  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 0.202***      
   (3.86)      
25 
Equally 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶  -0.146**     
   (-2.11)     
25 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶  0.259***     
    (4.51)     
10  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶   -0.213*    
     (-1.88)    
10  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶   0.239***    
     (3.05)    
50  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶    -0.155***   
      (-3.06)   
50  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶    0.192***   
      (3.85)   
25 
Usage 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶     -0.251***  
      (-3.39)  
25 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶     0.140**  
       (2.17)  
10  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶      -0.258** 
        (-2.36) 
10  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶      0.246*** 













Table 7 – continued 
 
  Control Variables 
  𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣 0.413*** 0.418*** 0.423*** 0.415*** 0.413*** 0.422*** 
   (7.97) (8.03) (8.14) (7.98) (7.94) (8.12) 
  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
   (10.39) (10.41) (10.48) (10.41) (10.43) (10.42) 
  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 
   (16.28) (16.25) (16.30) (16.26) (16.27) (16.26) 
  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.507*** -0.507*** -0.508*** -0.507*** -0.507*** -0.507*** 
   (-10.25) (-10.25) (-10.26) (-10.26) (-10.25) (-10.23) 
  𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑅𝑜𝐴)) -0.183* -0.186* -0.187* -0.189* -0.178 -0.182* 
   (-1.66) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.72) (-1.64) (-1.73) 
  𝑀/𝐵 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
   (-1.77) (-1.76) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.76) (-1.76) 
  𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑁𝑢𝑚 0.533*** 0.541*** 0.548*** 0.534*** 0.545*** 0.546*** 
   (15.17) (15.53) (15.73) (15.23) (15.59) (15.67) 
  𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 -0.444*** -0.450*** -0.456*** -0.445*** -0.455*** -0.455*** 
   (-15.28) (-15.63) (-15.84) (-15.34) (-15.72) (-15.76) 
  Constant 6.457*** 6.601*** 6.714*** 6.472*** 6.709*** 6.688*** 
   (9.54) (9.82) (10.01) (9.60) (9.95) (9.95) 
  Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Observations 4,307 4,307 4,307 4,307 4,307 4,307 
  Adjusted R
2
 0.187 0.185 0.183 0.186 0.185 0.184 
  F-statistic 78.512 78.869 78.062 78.503 78.212 79.579 
 
We run standard OLS regressions (using robust standard errors) to identify the factors that determine stock price synchronicity as calculated in Equation (4). The 
coefficients and respective t-statistics are in parentheses below. The independent variables are 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶, 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐺𝑜𝑣, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒, 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑅𝑜𝐴)), 𝑀/𝐵, 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑁𝑢𝑚, and 𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (see appendix A.2 for variable descriptions and calculation methods). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2)  is equal to 1 for 
the 2.5-year period after the WTO event, and 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) is equal to 1 for the 2.5-year period before the WTO event, and 0 otherwise. The selection 
period for the REECs is two years prior to the WTO event. The regressions are applied for the equally-weighted and the usage-weighted FOB REE Indices to form 
portfolios of 10, 25, and 50 companies with the highest 𝑅2 in Equation (6). Specifications (1)-(3) are the multivariate pendants of the univariate results from Table 5 
in panel (A), Equally-Weighted FOB REEs Index for a selection period two years before the WTO-event and the comparison [Pre; Post]. Similarly, specifications 
(4)-(6) are the multivariate pendants of the univariate results from Table 5 in panel (C), Equally-Weighted FOB REE Index for a selection period of two years before 
the WTO event and the comparison [Pre; Post]. For better orientation, the corresponding univariate results are framed with dotted lines in Table 5. Investigating the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) reveals no evidence of multicollinearity, because all VIFs are well below the critical value of 5 (see Kutner et al., 2005). ***, **, 













Change in Stock Price Synchronicity of REE Industry Companies after the WTO Event – Multivariate Evidence (Alternative Estimation Strategies) 
 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares with Newey-West Standard Errors 
# 
REECs 
Weighting  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
50  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 -0.183***      
   (-3.25)      
50  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 0.222***      
   (3.79)      
25 
Equally 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶  -0.157**     
   (-2.07)     
25 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶  0.284***     
    (4.42)     
10  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶   -0.222**    
     (-1.99)    
10  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶   0.275***    
     (3.32)    
50  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶    -0.166***   
      (-2.98)   
50  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶    0.210***   
      (3.88)   
25 
Usage 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶     -0.264***  
      (-3.26)  
25 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶     0.165**  
       (2.29)  
10  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶      -0.268*** 
        (-2.59) 
10  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶      0.265*** 
        (3.38) 
  Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 













Table 8– continued  
 
Panel B: Random Effects Estimation 
# 
REECs 
Weighting  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
50  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 -0.166***      
   (-2.65)      
50  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 0.131*      
   (1.90)      
25 
Equally 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶  -0.146*     
   (-1.69)     
25 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶  0.191**     
    (2.02)     
10  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶   -0.209    
     (-1.56)    
10  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶   0.203    
     (1.41)    
50  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶    -0.148**   
      (-2.37)   
50  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶    0.118*   
      (1.73)   
25 
Usage 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶     -0.267***  
      (-3.06)  
25 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶     0.067  
       (0.72)  
10  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏2) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶      -0.258* 
        (-1.92) 
10  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂(𝜏1) × 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶      0.186 
        (1.34) 
  Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Observations 4,307 4,307 4,307 4,307 4,307 4,307 
 
This table replicates Table 7, but shows results for alternative estimation strategies to the OLS regressions used in Table 7 in order to identify factors determining 
stock price synchronicity as calculated in Equation (4). Independent variables are equal to those in Table 7, but for clarity we do not report the coefficients and t-
statistics for the control variables. Panel A shows the results for two-stage least squares regressions using Newey-West standard errors with lag(1); in panel B, 
random effects models are used. Investigating the variance inflation factors (VIFs) reveals no evidence of multicollinearity, because all VIFs are well below the 













Static Difference-in-Differences (DiD) Between Option Pricing Models Before and After the WTO Event 
  
Call Options Put Options 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
𝑃𝐷 |𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻| |𝐵𝑆 − 𝐻𝑁| |𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻𝑁| 𝑃𝐷 |𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻| |𝐵𝑆 − 𝐻𝑁| |𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻𝑁| 
Cerium 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 188.32 26.91 92.53 68.88 150.67 14.73 68.36 67.58 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 57.88 27.54 27.83 2.51 16.83 7.62 7.49 1.72 
DiD -130.44 0.63 -64.70 -66.36 -133.84 -7.11 -60.87 -65.86 
DiD in% -69.26% 2.33% -69.92% -96.35% -88.83% -48.29% -89.04% -97.46% 
Lanthanum 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 230.76 106.24 114.86 9.67 183.98 83.11 91.92 8.96 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 55.11 26.39 26.17 2.54 16.95 7.68 7.69 1.58 
DiD -175.65 -79.84 -88.68 -7.13 -167.03 -75.43 -84.23 -7.38 
DiD in% -76.12% -75.16% -77.21% -73.69% -90.79% -90.76% -91.63% -82.39% 
Neodymium 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 138.68 69.33 34.09 35.26 93.96 46.29 10.91 36.76 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 51.12 25.10 22.98 3.04 15.42 6.43 6.41 2.57 
DiD -87.56 -44.23 -11.11 -32.22 -78.55 -39.86 -4.49 -34.19 
DiD in% -63.14% -63.79% -32.59% -91.38% -83.59% -86.11% -41.19% -93.01% 
Yttrium 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 377.26 188.32 137.99 50.96 382.06 190.91 117.97 73.18 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 77.10 36.52 36.95 3.62 30.75 13.75 13.97 3.03 
DiD -300.16 -151.79 -101.03 -47.34 -351.31 -177.16 -104.00 -70.15 
DiD in% -79.56% -80.61% -73.22% -92.90% -91.95% -92.80% -88.16% -95.87% 
This table shows the differences among three option pricing models (Black-Scholes, 1973; Duan, 1995; and Heston and Nandi, 2000) for put and call options on 
REEs (cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium) (see Fig. 2 for an illustration). Column (2) shows the sum of thirty-five absolute differences between the Black-
Scholes (1973) and Duan (1995) call option prices. We calculate the prices for 35 [= 7  5] distinct combinations of time to maturity and strike price (seven strike 
prices [85%, 90%, …, 115%] and five times to maturity [one, three, six, nine, and twelve months]). Columns (3) and (4) are similar, but show instead the differences 
in call option prices between Black-Scholes (1973) and Heston and Nandi (2000) (column (3)), and Duan (1995) and Heston and Nandi (2000) (column (4)). Column 
(1) is equal to the sum of columns (2), (3), and (4) (see Table 10 for a sample calculation for lanthanum, which is framed with a dotted line and shaded in grey). 
Columns (5), (6), (7), and (8) follow the same system for put options. The differences between the option pricing models are calculated at the WTO event based on 
the REE prices thirty months before (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂) and are compared to thirty months after (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂) the WTO event, but considering REE prices beginning at the 
WTO event and for the subsequent thirty months. To show the difference-in-difference (“DiD”) between the option model pricing differences in response to the 
WTO event, we subtract from the respective squared 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 option price differences (𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂) the absolute 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂 option price differences (𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂). 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑦 𝑆/𝐾 |𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻| |𝐵𝑆 − 𝐻𝑁| |𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻𝑁| 
1m 
0.85 0.22 0.28 0.06 
0.9 0.62 0.68 0.06 
0.95 1.15 1.19 0.04 
1 1.23 1.52 0.29 
1.05 1.07 1.23 0.15 
1.1 0.56 0.74 0.17 
1.15 0.38 0.44 0.06 
 
SUM 5.23 6.08 0.85 
3m 
0.85 1.36 1.57 0.21 
0.9 1.94 2.17 0.23 
0.95 2.44 2.49 0.04 
1 2.37 2.43 0.06 
1.05 2.13 2.32 0.19 
1.1 2.04 2.18 0.14 
1.15 1.53 1.46 0.07 
 
SUM 13.82 14.63 0.94 
6m 
0.85 2.83 2.81 0.01 
0.9 3.60 3.66 0.06 
0.95 3.52 3.37 0.16 
1 3.28 3.89 0.61 
1.05 3.41 3.46 0.06 
1.1 3.17 3.31 0.15 
1.15 2.08 2.90 0.82 
 
SUM 21.88 23.40 1.87 
9m 
0.85 3.92 4.41 0.49 
0.9 4.43 4.93 0.50 
0.95 4.58 5.36 0.78 
1 5.02 4.73 0.29 
1.05 4.50 4.63 0.12 
1.1 4.00 4.08 0.08 
1.15 4.03 4.78 0.75 
 
SUM 30.48 32.92 3.01 
12m 
0.85 4.70 5.49 0.79 
0.9 4.99 5.59 0.60 
0.95 5.13 5.40 0.27 
1 5.80 5.88 0.08 
1.05 5.05 5.42 0.37 
1.1 5.15 5.41 0.26 
1.15 4.01 4.63 0.62 
 
SUM 34.83 37.82 3.00 
𝑷𝑫 230.76 106.24 114.86 9.67 
 
This table shows detailed calculations for each absolute pricing difference between all three option pricing models 
for all distinct lanthanum call option combinations for times to maturity and strike prices. The calculations 
correspond to the framed dotted cells, which are shaded in grey in Table 9 and for the last line 𝑃𝐷 shows the 
aggregated values also shown in Table 9 in column (1). 𝑦 is equal to time to maturity and 𝑆/𝐾 is the ratio of the spot 

















|𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻| |𝐵𝑆 − 𝐻𝑁| |𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻𝑁| 
No
bs 
𝑆/𝐾 𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂














































         
 



































|𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻| |𝐵𝑆 − 𝐻𝑁| |𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻𝑁| 
No
bs 
𝑆/𝐾 𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂




























1.1 1.749 2.303 6.44 0.883 1.385 6.23 1.187 1.263 5.46 150 
1.15 1.513 1.955 6.69 0.706 1.091 6.35 1.044 1.109 4.54 150 
𝑦 
         
 





































|𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻| |𝐵𝑆 − 𝐻𝑁| |𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻𝑁| 
No
bs 
𝑆/𝐾 𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂














8.065 8.127 8.10 150 






9.017 9.062 5.81 
150 






11.296 11.363 6.28 
150 






11.747 11.835 6.20 
150 






12.044 12.113 4.44 
150 






18.974 19.056 5.20 
150 






14.661 14.750 6.11 
150 
𝑦 
         
 






4.045 4.067 5.97 210 






22.995 23.045 7.34 
210 






10.269 10.337 7.37 
210 






11.053 11.160 8.03 
210 











|𝐵𝑆 − 𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻| |𝐵𝑆 − 𝐻𝑁| |𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻𝑁| 
No
bs 
𝑆/𝐾 𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂







𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂








0.85 -0.746 0.998 8.97 2.942 4.686 8.98 3.769 3.825 7.57 150 
0.9 -0.696 1.307 9.23 3.472 5.466 9.21 4.227 4.270 5.39 150 
0.95 -0.576 1.632 8.58 3.810 6.026 8.64 4.420 4.476 5.00 150 
1 -0.445 1.780 8.43 3.925 6.114 8.28 4.316 4.371 5.32 150 
1.05 -0.340 1.634 9.40 3.520 5.514 9.67 3.807 3.869 4.91 150 
1.1 -0.226 1.460 10.28 3.044 4.754 10.26 3.202 3.243 2.84 150 
1.15 -0.195 1.238 9.88 2.537 3.939 9.70 2.621 2.669 3.26 150 
𝑦 
         
 
1m -0.364 0.156 9.50 0.903 1.423 9.37 1.416 1.436 5.29 210 
3m -0.763 0.541 12.08 2.184 3.492 12.12 2.952 2.991 6.23 210 
6m -0.678 1.367 12.64 3.558 5.598 12.58 4.132 4.188 6.25 210 
9m -0.384 2.200 12.53 4.555 7.135 12.57 4.869 4.935 5.57 210 
12m -0.114 2.913 12.52 5.406 8.422 12.50 5.462 5.538 5.47 210 
 
This table shows the mean values of the DiDs from the “control” (𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂)) and “treatment” 
periods (𝐷𝑖𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑊𝑇𝑂 − 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑇𝑂)) for the REEs cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium based on call 
options. “𝑡-stat (DDD)” is the 𝑡 −statistic testing 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘 against zero. 𝑦 is equal to time to maturity, and 𝑆/𝐾 is the 















Do Announcements of WTO Dispute Resolution 
Cases Matter? Evidence from the  
Rare Earth Elements Market 
 
Highlights 
 Rare earth elements (REEs) are important for green- and high-technology products 
 Announcements of WTO dispute resolution cases have the power to change market 
dynamics 
 The price-generating process of REEs changes after the announcement 
 Stock price informativeness of companies in the REEs industry increases after the 
announcement 
 Model uncertainty for option pricing models decreases after the announcement 
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